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A SLOW BUT steady march out of recession in the early 1990s set
the stage for what would become one of the greatest explosions in
growth of the capital markets. It was an unprecedented combination
of excess venture capital, coupled with the new and seemingly limit-
less potential of developing computer technologies, particularly the
internet, which created the now infamous "dot-corn" boom that
culminated in early 2000. From 1995 to the beginning of 2000, the
DowJones Industrial Average' ("DJIA") went from a value under 4000
to nearly 12,000,2 representing an almost 300 percent increase.
By early 2000, the bubble had begun to burst, and companies
began to collapse by the hundreds.3 As stock prices tumbled, it be-
came increasingly apparent that the downturn was not simply the
product of a weak economy. "[I] rrational exuberance," as Federal Re-
serve Chairman Alan Greenspan termed it, 4 had seemingly en-
couraged companies themselves to dabble in accounting sleight of
* Class of 2004. The author dedicates this Comment to his parents, whose support,
love, and encouragement have been invaluable.
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 507 (7th ed. 1999) ("A stock-market-performance in-
dicator that consists of the price movements in the stocks of 30 leading industrial compa-
nies in the United States.").
2. See Michael Gonzalez, Stock Prices Rebound and Ease Investors' Fears of Rising Rates,
WALL ST.J., Mar. 9, 1995, at C2 (noting that the DowJones Industrial Average (DJIA) was
3979.23 on Mar. 9, 1995); see also Robert O'Brien, Chase, JP. Morgan and Citigroup Slide, as
Rate Fears Roil Stocks, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 4, 2000, at Al (noting that the DJIA was 11357.51 on
Jan. 4, 2000).
3. For a partial list of internet companies which disintegrated during this era, see
HOOVER'S ONLINE, DEAD DoT-CoM LIST, at http://www.hoovers.com/news/detail/
0,2417,11_3584,00.html (last accessed March 22, 2003).
4. Chairman Greenspan first coined this famous phrase in a 1996 speech. See David
Wessel, Fed Chairman Pops the Big Question: Is Market Too High?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1996, at
A3.
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hand, overstating earnings and painting an overly rosy picture of a
financial garden that was tattered with weeds. 5
The coup de grace was the collapse of the Enron Corporation,
which filed for bankruptcy protection in December of 2001.6 All the
skeletons in its closet were released and the nightmare was revealed-
earnings had been overstated by $567 million, plus many of its
thousands of hard working blue collar employees suffered the loss of
over $1 billion in pension plan savings.7
Even the passive, pro-business Bush administration could not ig-
nore the political disaster that was destroying the lives of so many hon-
est Americans. Washington was pressed to act in order to prevent a
similar scandal from ever happening again. The proposed legislation,
co-sponsored by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael
Oxley8 and bearing their names, was the Bush administration's re-
sponse to the charlatans of Wall Street.9
The bill's main goals were to increase oversight of the accounting
industry, 10 and increase civil and criminal penalties for corporate mal-
feasance." The bill also contained provisions detailing new rules of
professional responsibility for attorneys who appear and practice
before the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 12 These
provisions, known as the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attor-
neys, place a greater burden on securities attorneys to police corpo-
rate malfeasance. They have generated a great debate about the new
role attorneys will play in the securities bar-especially relating to the
traditional requirement of attorney-client confidentiality.
This Comment will begin with an analysis of the economics fol-
lowing the Great Depression, as many of the issues that fueled the new
legislation appeared years ago to encourage the creation of the SEC.
5. See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate 88, at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03138.pdf (last accessed Oct. 29, 2003) (stating that in 1997, 92 public compa-
nies filed earnings restatements, and by 2001 that number had increased to 244).
6. See Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2001, at A3 (stating that Enron was, at the time, the largest bankruptcy filing in
United States history). For a list of the largest United States filings, see Michael T. Burr,
Bankruptcy Gives United Second Chance at Taking Off 13 CoRP. LEGAL TIMES 12 (Feb. 2003).
7. See John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big
Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
9. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2002, at Al.
10. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101-109.
11. See id. §§ 801-1107.
12. See id. § 307.
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A brief discussion of the reporting requirements under the federal
securities laws will follow, focusing on how the regulations are in-
tended to help avoid investor fraud. Next, this Comment will review
the role the corporate securities lawyer plays in the securities registra-
tion process and follow with a discussion of the corporate collapse
that occurred during the late 1990s. Part II will introduce the new
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, giving an overview of the whole Act, then
focusing on the specific requirements of the section 307 rules for at-
torneys. A discussion of the SEC comment and review process will pre-
cede an analysis of the final rules as issued by the SEC.
This Comment will then argue that the new rules for attorney
conduct in section 307 are misguided, because corporate attorneys
were not a source of the problem that led to the corporate meltdown.
Unintended side effects of the new legislation will then be explored,
focusing on potential loopholes in the new legislation that may prove
fatal. A glimpse of the future follows, looking specifically at the pro-
posed, but as yet unadopted noisy withdrawal and the ongoing
changes to the ABA Model Rules, showing how the new laws will affect
attorneys in unforeseen ways. This Comment will conclude by arguing
that the reason companies like Enron were able to get away with such
egregious fraud was because important safeguards for the market had
been removed in the years leading up to the fiscal collapse. In addi-
tion, the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA") in 1995 and the Supreme Court's decision to remove aid-
ing and abetting liability for securities fraud worked to remove ob-
scure but important market policing devices that hastened the
downfall of the old order.
I. Background
A. Overview of the Securities and Exchange Conmiission
A look back at the creation of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is instructive in light of the recent corporate meltdowns be-
cause it, too, was born from an era of unprecedented stock market
fraud, resulting from a similar boom-to-bust decade.
During the 1920s, after the First World War ended, the United
States entered a period of great economic gain, with economic growth
averaging 5.9 percent per year.13 American industries grew with con-
siderably less competition because the European economies were in
13. See THoMAs E. HALL &J. DAVID FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 44-61 (1998).
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tatters following the horror of the First World War. 14 New technolo-
gies like the radio, the vacuum, and other household appliances were
capturing the attention of the American consumer.1 5 Companies like
RCA, Ford, and AT&T dominated the era by producing fascinating
new products with mass appeal.' 6 Stock prices rose steadily through-
out the decade, suffering only occasional and relatively minor drops
in value in between.1 7 The growth was fueled by speculation that the
prices could only get higher. 18 One respected member of the Federal
Reserve Board colorfully referred to 1929 as a "period of optimism
gone wild and cupidity gone drunk."1 9 Investors were buying stocks on
margin, which is essentially a loan by a broker for the purpose of buy-
ing stock.20 By the end of 1928, the interest rate a broker or bank
could charge for loans on margin had risen to 12 percent.2 1 This was
an astonishing rate that encouraged an increasing influx of capital by
institutions to support the speculation. 22
The end of the boom market finally came in 1929.23 Over the
period of one week in late October, the New York Stock Exchange
teetered on the edge of failure. Overvalued stocks purchased in mar-
gin accounts during a run-up of prices collapsed.2 4 By the end of trad-
ing on black Tuesday, October 29th, the DJIA had lost almost half its
value. 25 The rest of the story is history-a worldwide depression and
14. See id. (noting the high unemployment rates and loss of population that Great
Britain, Germany, and France suffered in the war).
15. See HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 13, at 17-18.
16. See HAROLD BIERMAN,JR., THE CAUSES OF THE 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH 8 (1998).
RCA was the high growth speculative stock of the day, reaching a pre-crash high of $101 a
share, sinking all the way to $28 in early November 1929. Id.
17. See id. at 3 (noting that in 1922 the DJIA was valued at 91.0; by 1929 it had reached
a value of 290.0).
18. See id. at 29.
19. Id. at 30.
20. SeeJOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 20 (1979). If a stock contin-
ues to increase in value, then the margin loan can be repaid from the proceeds of the gain
in price. However, when the price goes down, the investor must make up the difference
when the margin loan comes due. Most loans by a broker are retrievable on demand, an
event known as the margin call. When a margin call comes and stocks are falling, many
investors can be quickly ruined by their margin obligations.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 88-89.
24. See id. at 88-107.
25. See id. at 111-113.
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almost complete financial collapse of the American economy
ensued.
26
Ultimately, there were many factors which potentially led to the
crash of 1929, such as overvaluation of stocks, 27 excessive purchasing
in margin accounts, 28 and a tight monetary policy at the Federal Re-
serve.29 However, a major element was outright fraud by companies
listed on the stock exchange. At the time, there were no Federal laws
governing the sales of securities to the public, and the various state
laws in place were ineffective at policing the massive increase in stock
transactions. 30
In response, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 l ("'33
Act") and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("'34 Act").32 The
main thrust of the '33 Act was to require that publicly traded compa-
nies disclose material information regarding their operations, so that
an investor could weigh all of the risks and make a fully informed
decision before purchasing stock.33 A main element of this goal is an
SEC registration requirement for any company that chooses to sell
securities in interstate commerce to the public at large.34 The goal of
disclosure is not to pinpoint the risks and rewards of the individual
security, but rather to provide all the necessary information that a rea-
26. See generally HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 13 (taking a broad view of the interna-
tional impact of the depression in which the U.S. stock market collapse was an event in a
much larger chain).
27. See BIERMAN, supra note 16, at 1.
28. See id. at 71 (describing the huge volume of margin accounts in the late 1920s). In
1934, the Federal Reserve Board was given authority to set minimum requirements for
margin purchases. See NORMAN G. FOSBACK, STOCK MARKET LOGIC 35 (1993).
29. See HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 13, at 29.
30. At the time, most states had various provisions forbidding fraud in the sale of
securities. See DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION 146 (5th ed.
1996).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1995).
32. Id. §§ 78a-78mm.
33. See Preamble to Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1995) ("An Act to
provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other
purposes.").
34. See id. § 77e ("Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any
means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for
delivery after sale.").
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sonable investor would require to make an informed purchase of the
security. 35
The requirements of the '34 Act augmented the registration pro-
cess by requiring that an issuer who has filed under the '33 Act con-
tinue to report, at regular intervals, the financial condition of its
company.36 These reports are intended to keep investors apprised of
any changes in the fortunes of their investment, and companies that
file them are often referred to as "'34 Act reporting companies." Gen-
erally, there are two reports that a company must file with the SEC: an
annual 10-K report, which is a detailed report of company finances
and performance over the preceding fiscal year,37 and a 10-Q or quar-
terly report, which briefly summarizes company performance over the
immediately preceding three month period.38 When sudden or unan-
ticipated events occur, such as the resignation of key management,
sudden changes in earnings expectations, or other unforeseen events
that might affect the value of a security, a company is required to file
an 8-K report detailing the event and its potential effects. 39
This extensive regulatory web is designed to keep current infor-
mation flowing from the company to the investor so that they can con-
stantly evaluate the merits of their investment. As long as the
information provided is accurate, the goal of disclosure is met and in
theory, fraud should be at a minimum. The goal and the reality do not
always coincide so neatly.
B. The Role of the Corporate Securities Attorney
Understanding the role of the securities attorney is critical to as-
sessing his role in the corporate structure. This, in turn, is critical to a
discussion of the scope of his ethical duty to the corporation, the di-
rectors and officers, and the shareholders. Although many profession-
als interact to produce the often voluminous SEC filings, the attorney
35. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES IN-
DUSTRY, PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#
secact1933 (last accessed Mar. 23, 2003) ("A primary means of accomplishing these goals
[of the '33 Act] is the disclosure of important financial information through the registra-
tion of securities. This information enables investors, not the government, to make in-
formed judgments about whether to purchase a company's securities.").
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 781.
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-1 (2003) ("Every registrant under the Securities Act of
1933 shall file an annual report.., for the fiscal year in which the registration statement
... became effective and for each fiscal year thereafter.").
38. See id. § 240.15d-13 (2003).
39. See id. § 240.15d-11 (2003).
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occupies a position that involves him uniquely in critical financial
transactions and decisions.
Securities attorneys come in two general varieties: those that re-
present the issuer of the securities and those that represent the under-
writer, or investment bank.40 Many companies also have in-house
counsel who assist in the preparation of registration statements and
reports,41 but for large issuances of securities to the public, the is-
suer's counsel and underwriter's counsel square off in a battle over
what information must ultimately be included in the registration
statement.
42
To avoid liability for any misstatements in a registration statement
or any other '34 Act filings, the underwriter must exercise "due dili-
gence" in reviewing the documents produced by the issuer,43 a task
typically relegated to the underwriter's counsel.44 Underwriters, wish-
ing to minimize their liability exposure for misstatements in registra-
tion statements, consequently demand great diligence on the part of
their counsel. 45
The standard for diligence for producing a registration statement
is stated concisely in the '33 Act as "that of a prudent man in the
management of his own property."46 If this standard is met, the under-
writer (and his counsel) will probably be found to have exercised "due
diligence" and be exempt from liability if suit is brought by an investor
who relied to his detriment on misleading information contained in a
registration statement.47
However, under the due diligence defense offered under the '33
Act, an attorney can find safe harbor from liability for complicated
financial information communicated in statements made by account-
ants. 48 When a so-called "expertised" portion of a statement is in-
cluded in the filings, such as audited financial information from an
40. See RATNER & HAZEN, supra note 30, at 16.
41. See id.
42. See MATTHEW BENDER & CO., SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 15.06 (2002).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (5) (1995) (attaching civil liability for any materially mis-
leading statements contained in a registration statement to "every underwriter with respect
to such security."). For the companion '34 Act liability provision, see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a).
44. See BENDER & Co., supra note 42.
45. See id.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c).
47. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dis-
cussing in detail underwriters' counsel who failed to meet the due diligence threshold).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3).
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accountant, the attorney need only have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that it is true.49
Generally, therefore, an attorney working for an issuer is not re-
sponsible for checking the validity of the actual numbers contained in
a financial statement. He is generally responsible for assuring that the
statement contains no materially misleading statements, or as the Su-
preme Court has stated it, "there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea-
sonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of infor-
mation made available" to the investor.50 A securities attorney is not
an accountant, and therefore he is not liable for mistakes in the num-
bers that an accountant produces.5 1
The '34 Act, as noted previously, governs the ongoing reporting
requirements once an issuer has filed a registration statement with the
SEC.5 2 There is no due diligence defense under the '34 Act for an
attorney who is helping prepare the annual and quarterly reports. To
attach liability to an attorney, an aggrieved investor must establish that
the attorney was somehow engaging in fraud.5 3 This is known as Rule
1Ob-5 liability, and was seen as a very powerful tool that investors could
use to police fraud practiced by "any person" who "employ[ed] any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. '54
It was generally felt that all parties involved in the fraud could be
liable under Rule lOb-5, but the Supreme Court ruled in 1994 that
such liability could not extend to those who only aided and abetted
the securities fraud. 55 Congress, in response to the limitations placed
on Rule 10b-5 by the Court, passed legislation the following year to
restore the ability of the SEC to go after aiders and abetters,5 6 but did
not extend the cause of action to private plaintiffs. Because of these
developments, attorneys are largely shielded from liability under the
49. Id. See also BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 682 (detailing the due diligence defense as
applied to all the actors generally involved in preparing registration statements for the
SEC).
50. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3).
52. See id. § 781.
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
54. Id.
55. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2001) ("any person that knowingly provides substantial assis-
tance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regula-
tion issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the
same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.").
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'34 Act, unless they can be shown to be primary violators. 57 Success-
fully establishing that an attorney was a primary violator is nearly im-
possible, because they act as a link in the chain, and are not involved
in assessing the validity of the financial statements, but instead assure
that the required documents are filed with the SEC.
C. The Corporate Colapse
It is essential to have a general understanding of the scope and
nature of corporate greed as well as the regulatory atmosphere that
led to the demise of corporate giants like Enron. To understand
sweeping legislation such as this, one must also understand the source
of the momentum that brought forth such rapid change.
This time around, no great crash woke the masses and shook
them out of their irrational stock buying spree. Fundamentally, the
stock market was on steadier ground than in 1929, and safeguards
existed to prevent another total collapse. 58 The crisis that spurred the
recent change came mostly from large corporations that abused the
reporting requirements, engaged in creative accounting practices,
and sculpted corporate arrangements to make complicated corporate
transactions look and feel legitimate. No single company demon-
strated this attitude more than Enron, and arguably no single com-
pany had more to do with the resulting flurry of legislative change.59
The fall of Enron alone would have been significant because of its
size and the scope of its fraud,60 but the scandals were illustrative of
fraud endemic to corporations everywhere. 61 Trusted companies like
Xerox were indulging in misleading accounting practices and eroding
the trust of investors.62 What was it that they did?
57. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177-78 ("The proscription does not include
giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act. We cannot amend the
statute to create liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within
the meaning of the statute.").
58. See HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 13, at 165 (stating that the Federal Reserve is
now keen in the face of sudden crisis to flood the financial system with money and lower
interest rates quickly to maintain liquidity in the markets).
59. U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 2-4 (2002).
60. See id. (noting that at the time of its bankruptcy filing, Enron was the seventh
largest publicly traded corporation in America).
61. SeeJesse Drucker & Henny Sender, Sony, Wrong Number: Strategy Behind Accounting
Scheme, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A9.
62. SeeJames Bandler & John Hechinger, Leading the News: SEC Says Xerox Misled Inves-
tors by Manipulating Its Earnings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2002, at A3 (noting that Xerox
"agreed to pay a record $10 million civil penalty and restate its earnings covering four years
to settle the SEC charges detailed in the complaint").
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Enron was at the head of the class when it came to innovative
accounting practices. In theory, the best way to boost the value of a
company is to hide its losses while showcasing its gains. This allows a
corporation to appear as if they are growing without limit, and with-
out downside risk. Enron essentially created that scenario. It formed
finance entities, called "Raptors," which were used to hedge against
declines in volatile energy stocks. 63 The Raptors were subsidiaries En-
ron claimed were independently owned but were in fact financed al-
most entirely by Enron itself. Enron wanted to keep the assets and
debts of these entities off its own financial statements, but to do so
under the existing accounting rules, outside investors would have to
put up at least three percent of the working capital for each one.
64
This made it possible to treat the Raptors as subsidiaries, and the gains
and losses they suffered would not be reflected on Enron's balance
sheets. However, the three percent investment came from a company
called LJM2 Co-Investment LP, which was actually a partnership estab-
lished by Enron's CFO, Andrew Fastow. He provided the Raptors with
$30 million in cash, the three percent required, which they promptly
repaid plus a handsome $10 million in profit.65 The repayments
meant that Enron itself was exposed to the liability entirely and was
required to report the huge losses-almost $500 million in six
months-the Raptors suffered in its own financial statements. Enron
was fully exposed to the liability that the Raptors were incurring, but
investors had no idea because the information was not disclosed. The
value of Enron's stock was ostensibly based on what it reported in
quarterly and annual reports. These reports hid almost $500 million
in loses and investors were caught completely off guard.
In another coup, Enron's CEO Jeff Skilling convinced regulators
in 1992 to allow the company to use market-to-market accounting
methods, which allowed the energy giant to book earnings based on
transactions that had occurred during each day.6 6 This accounting
method is similar to what brokerages use to record sales at the end of
the day. 6 7 This change allowed Enron to book earnings from long
term contracts as current income, even though it had received no pay-
ments and might never see them.6 8
63. Kathryn Kranhold, et. al., Following the Trail: As Enron Inquiiy Intensifies, Midlevel
Players Face Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at Al.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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The dual process of shielding debt in off-balance-sheet entities,
plus the inflated booking of income allowed Enron to appear as if it
were taking over the world. The stock soared as investors piled on the
bus, while the company continued to meet and exceed every one of its
earnings forecasts. Eventually, the lies could no longer be kept, and as
the stock price began to fall, the whole venture collapsed, leaving
thousands unemployed, and their retirement funds in ruins.
H. The Sarbanes-Oxley Amendments
By the summer of 2002, Congress had decided to take action and
get tough on corporate malfeasance. In July 2002 a bill was passed
which would curb the abuses and reinforce existing regulations.69 The
bill, co-sponsored by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative
Michael Oxley,70 was Congress's response to the declining confidence
of investors in the capital markets.71 The Act was signed into law by
the President amid great fanfare on July 30, 2002.72
A. Overview of the Entire Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's ("the Act") main goals were to increase
oversight of the accounting industry73 and increase civil and criminal
penalties for corporate malfeasance.7 4 The majority of the damage
done to corporate confidence during the meltdown came from ac-
tions by accountants75 and heads of corporations. 76 Many accounting
firms were offering clients consulting services, such as tax advice on
certain dealings, or ways to shift assets to lower debt and avoid paying
69. See Shailagh Murray, Bill Overhauling Audit Regulation Passes in Senate, WALL ST. J.,
Jul. 16, 2002, at A3.
70. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
71. See President George W. Bush, Remarks at Signing of Bill to Combat Corporate
Fraud (Jul. 30, 2002) (transcript available at 2002 WL 1752435).
72. See Elisabeth Bumiller, BUSH SIGNS BILL AIMED AT FRAUD IN CORPORATIONS, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jul. 31, 2002, at Al.
73. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101-109.
74. See id. §§ 801-1107.
75. See 148 CONG. REc. S6561-01 (daily ed. Jul. 10, 2002) (statement of Rep. Levin)
("One key factor [for the corporate misconduct] is the terrible performance of too many
in the accounting profession.").
76. See id. (noting that the Rigas family, controlling members of the publicly traded
Adelphia Communications, were accused of borrowing over $2 billion from the company
and failing to pay it back, driving the company into bankruptcy).
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taxes.77 At the same time, they were acting as the auditor for the finan-
cial statements of the company. 78
This dual role created some difficult conflicts of interest because
the accounting firms were motivated by the need to retain the lucra-
tive consulting business to increase their earnings.7 9 To meet this end,
they had to avoid chaffing a CEO who was pushing to meet the market
earnings expectations that Wall Street demanded. 0 The result was
that accounting firms became softer in their review of financial state-
ments by a corporation, often accepting and categorizing income and
expenses in creative ways.8 1
The CEOs themselves were also seen as charlatans, and rightfully
so, based on the actions of many in their ranks, like Kenneth Lay at
Enron, Bernard Ebbers at WorldCom, and Dennis Kozlowski at
Tyco. 82 These CEOs misused the trust of their shareholders by engag-
ing in various forms of fraud to mislead investors.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 sought to address the entire pot-
pourri of grievances against corporate America. Title I established a
new Public Accounting Oversight Board,8 3 probably the largest and
most significant change in the law. This board will act as a regulatory
body to supervise accountants, 84 set industry standards,8 5 and imple-
77. See id. The most notorious example was the relationship between Enron and Ar-
thur Andersen, LLP. "By 1999, Andersen was earning more for its non-audit services than
for its audit services at Enron." Id.
78. See id. ("[I]n many cases the same Andersen employee served as both consultant
and auditor, essentially auditing his or her own work.").
79. See id. ("By 1999, 50% of firm revenues at the big five accounting firms came from
consulting, while only 34% came from auditing. A few years later, the data indicates that
almost 75 percent of the fees earned by the big five accounting firms came from non-audit
services. Specific company proxy statements show that many publicly traded companies
now pay millions more for consulting than they do for auditing.").
80. See id. ("Common sense tells us that as Andersen's joint efforts with Enron man-
agement increased, it became tougher and tougher for Andersen auditors to challenge
Enron transactions-after all, these transactions had been set up with Andersen's assis-
tance at the cost of millions of dollars.").
81. Id.
82. See Pia Sarkar, Ex-CEO Bernie Ebbers Flew High, Fell Hard and Took the Telecom Giant
with Him, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 27, 2002, at BI.
83. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-109, 116 Stat.
750-769 (2002).
84. Id. § 104(a) ("The Board shall conduct a continuing program of inspections to
assess the degree of compliance of each registered public accounting firm and associated
persons of that firm with this Act.").
85. Id. § 103(a)(1) ("The board shall, by rule, establish.., through adoption of stan-
dards ... such auditing and related attestation standards, such quality control standards,
and such ethical standards to be used by registered public accounting firms.").
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ment punishment for breaking the rules. 86 It will, in many ways, serve
the same function for the accounting industry that the SEC has for the
securities industry.
Title II addressed the problem of auditor independence.8 7 As
noted above, the dual role played by many of the large accounting
firms-offering consulting services while having to perform audits for
the same company-created a conflict of interest that needed atten-
tion. This section of the Act clearly defines actions that are outside the
scope of an auditor's services,8 8 and even contemplates that the major
accounting firms be required to rotate after a certain number of years
in service of one company, to avoid sweetheart deals and laxity from
long term business relationships. 89
Title III was directed at the heads of corporations, particularly the
malfeasant CEOs.90 This section forces CEOs, who sign an accounting
statement, to forfeit any performance bonuses received if that state-
ment is fraudulent.9 ' Further, it requires CEOs nationwide to certify
that their statements are accurate and true, attaching personal liability
if these statements are in fact untrue.92
The remaining Tides of the Act, IV through XI, focus on miscel-
laneous issues that arose from the scandals, including enhanced sen-
tencing for white collar crime,93 penalties for tampering,9 4 and
retaliation against informants of malfeasance.9 5
86. Id. § 105(a) ("The Board shall establish, by rule... fair procedures for the investi-
gation and disciplining of registered public accounting firms and associated persons of
such firms.").
87. See id. §§ 201-209.
88. See id. § 201. This is a toughly worded section which prohibits an accounting firm
engaged in providing auditing services to also provide, inter alia, "(3) appraisal or valua-
tion services ... (7) broker or dealer, investment advisor, or investment banking services
... (8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit ... (9) any other service
that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible." Id.
89. See id. § 207. Although not likely to occur, this section does require that the
"Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study and review of the poten-
tial effects of requiring the mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms." Id.
90. See id. §§ 301-307.
91. See id. § 304(a) (1).
92. See id. § 302(a).
93. See id. §§ 801-807.
94. Id. § 1102.
95. See id. § 1107.
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B. Section 307-New Rules for Attorneys
Section 307 was bundled into Title III of the Act, which carriers
the title "Corporate Responsibility." 96 It increases responsibilities for
attorneys who represent public companies by requiring them to dis-
close evidence of possible fraud "up the ladder," starting with the
chief legal counsel of the corporation.
The term "up the ladder" comes from analogizing the corporate
structure to a ladder, with the full board of directors at the top, and
the attorney somewhere further down on a lower rung. Each interval
above the attorney is occupied by a management level employee of
the corporation, beginning with the chief legal officer of the com-
pany.9 7 Next is the CEO, then the audit committee of the board of
directors, then, if available, a committee of the company consisting of
directors not employed by the company.98 The idea is that the attor-
ney, upon coming into contact with evidence of a possible securities
violation, will report to each of these persons or groups in turn, going
up the ladder until he reaches the top. The structure is based on the
assumption that the company's board of directors, as shareholder rep-
resentatives, would not sanction securities violations committed by the
CEO or others in employ of the company. Thus, the attorney serves as
an internal whistleblower, alerting management higher and higher on
the ladder until the fraud is smoked out.
Section 307 requires that the SEC "issue rules, in the public inter-
est and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum stan-
dards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers."99
Congress then directs the SEC, through the language of the statute, to
implement a rule which models the "up the ladder" disclosure de-
tailed in subsections (1) and (2).100 Congress, however, allowed the
SEC to retain its rule-making authority by including the words "includ-
ing a rule" in the statute before the description of the "up the ladder"
model.10 1 The use of this wording indicates that Congress wants the
SEC to implement the "up the ladder" reporting requirement, but
also wants the SEC to implement other rules as the agency deems
necessary.
96. See id. §§ 301-308.
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2) (2002).
98. See id. § 205.3(b) (3).
99. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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In subsection (1) the law requires an attorney "to report evidence
of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief
legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company."10 2 This is
the first rung of the ladder for disclosure.
If the chief executive officer or chief legal counsel fails to "appro-
priately respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate
remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation),"10 3 the
attorney then has a duty to "report the evidence to the audit commit-
tee of the board of directors.., or to another committee of the board
of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or in-
directly by the issuer, or to the board of directors."10 4
By the time the attorney reaches the board of directors, ideally
the potential fraud will be exposed and then remedied. The SEC also
proposed going beyond this and requiring a "noisy withdrawal," which
would require an attorney who has gone to the top of the ladder with
no remedy in sight to withdraw from representing the issuer and no-
tify the SEC. 10 5 This proposal, however, has not been accepted and
will be discussed in detail later in this Comment.
C. The SEC Review and Comment Process-The Making of the
Final Rules
When Congress passes legislation affecting the SEC, it generally
does so by setting broad goals in a statute without specifying the minu-
tia of how the new rules should affect day to day operation, as it gener-
ally did under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. The task of developing
and implementing the final regulations is left to the SEC. When legis-
lation is of a magnitude that will have a significant impact on the func-
tions of the securities industry, comment from the public is required
before implementing final rules of any kind.10 6
102. Id. § 307(1).
103. Id. § 307(2).
104. Id.
105. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF STAN-
DARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS 2, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8185.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) (1999) ("[I]n the adoption of substantive rules materially
affecting an industry or a segment of the public, such as accounting rules, every feasible
effort is made in advance of adoption to receive the views of persons to be affected.").
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The SEC does this by developing a proposed rule amendment
based on the language of the statute. 117 The proposed rule is then
published in both the Code of Federal Regulations and on the SEC
website for commentary and feedback by the public within a specified
time period after release.' 08 After the commentary period, the SEC
will examine all of the comments it has received and may review the
proposed rule. 10 9 The rule will frequently be revised, clarified, or
changed, depending on the nature and content of the responses. 110
Typically, the SEC will release the final rule, but in circumstances
where a proposal generates substantial commentary, a revised pro-
posed rule may be issued and the process will begin anew."'
The comments received on a proposed rule are extremely valua-
ble because they reflect the collective attitudes of practitioners, aca-
demics, and commentators regarding rule changes. 112  They
incorporate a wide range of viewpoints, helping to clarify the meaning
of terms, the intent of the rules, and reveal new angles on the argu-
ments already put forth to sculpt a final release that is more formed
than un-molded clay. The SEC thus ensures that it does not enact
rules by fiat, but through a collaborative enterprise which allows all
interested parties to express a point of view.113
D. New Standards of Professional Conduct
On November 21, 2002, the SEC released its proposed rules for
attorney conduct based on its interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 1 4 The debate over the proposal was robust, and ultimately
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1999) ("The Commission shall have authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this subchapter ....
108. 17 C.F.R. § 202.6(b).
109. Id. § 202.6(c) ("Following analysis of comments received, the rule may be adopted
in the form published or in a revised form in the light of such comments.").
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The SEC encourages and receives input from any person or company. See, e.g.,
SEC. AND EXCHG. COMM'N, SEC PROPOSED RULES, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro-
posed.shtm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) ("[E]very feasible effort is made in advance of adoption to
receive the views of persons to be affected.").
114. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PROPOSED RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS 1, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/fi-
nal/33-8150.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
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prompted 167 "timely comment letters" to the SEC.' 15 The comment
period exposed a rift between academics who support greater regula-
tion of the securities bar by the SEC and practitioners in the field who
do not.'1 6
The academics were led by Susan P. Koniak of Boston University
in a comment letter signed by approximately fifty leading professors at
law schools around the nation."17 This comment letter lucidly sup-
ported the proposed rules (with some clarifications and adjustments),
and offered support for the "noisy withdrawal" rule, which would re-
quire an attorney who had gone all the way up the ladder to withdraw
from representing an issuer.
On the other side of the debate were many notable securities
firms, including Latham and Watkins, 1 8 Palmer & Dodge, 119 plus a
letter signed by "77 law firms" firmly opposing the noisy withdrawal
proposal, but also arguing against ambitious rule changes to existing
law.' 20 The law firms reasoned that such a drastic change would re-
quire careful balancing of the various state ethics laws and establishing
a noisy withdrawal would have a damaging effect on a client's ability to
confide in his attorney. 121 They argued it was best for the state courts,
not the SEC, to make such a profound change in the law. 122
Ultimately, the SEC issued a final rule, but suspended implemen-
tation of the noisy withdrawal rule to allow for an additional comment
115. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF STAN-
DARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS 2, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8185.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
116. Gary Young, Law Professors Question Attack on SEC, 229 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 2003, at 5.
The full range of all responses to the rule proposal can be viewed at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502.shtml (last accessed Feb. 14, 2003).
117. See Comment letter from Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton and George M. Co-
hen (with Attached List of Supporting Academics), to the SEC (April 7, 2003), at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/skoniakl.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
118. See Comment letter from Latham & Watkins, to the SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), at http:/
/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/lathaml.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
119. See Comment letter from Palmer & Dodge, to the SEC (Dec. 24, 2002), at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/palmerdodgel.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
120. See Comment letter from 77 Law Firms, to the SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77lawfirms1.htm (last accessed Oct. 28,
2003).
121. See id.
122. See id.
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period. 123 The final rule tracks closely the requirements set forth by
Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 124
IV. Argument
A. The Attorneys Were Never the True Source of the Problem
Much ire has been directed at Enron's chief outside counsel, Vin-
son & Elkins, especially in the congressional hearings that followed
the energy company's demise. 1 25 It is this anger, the feeling that the
attorneys did nothing while the company self-destructed, or that Vin-
son & Elkins actually had a hand in deceiving investors that drove
Congress to ultimately examine the role that attorneys play. Sherron
Watkins, a vice president at Enron who is now known as the Enron
whistle-blower, resisted having Vinson & Elkins investigate her claims
of wrongdoing because she harbored doubts about their integrity, be-
lieving their role in the scandal was deep.1 26
Vinson & Elkins's role in the corporate meltdown is mixed, and
the details are still emerging. 127 What is clear is that Vinson & Elkins
should have "brought a stronger, more objective and more critical
voice to the disclosure process."'128 While there are investor lawsuits
still pending against Vinson & Elkins and the ultimate status of their
liability is undetermined, it is generally agreed that they were more
part of the problem than the solution at Enron.
What has been lost in the intense focus on Enron is that it was
clearly an example of how bad things can become when the right ele-
ments are present, but it is not an example of how the securities in-
dustry functions as a whole. Enron and Vinson & Elkins were
123. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF STAN-
DARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR Ar roRNmvs 2, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8185.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
124. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 205 (1999).
125. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Lawmakers Contend Lawyers for Enron Should Have Raised
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at Cl.
126. Id. (noting it was Watkins who was championed by Congress for her vigilant ac-
tons in trying to alert then C.E.O. Kenneth L. Lay, warning that "Enron could 'implode in
a wave of accounting scandals."'). See also Thomas S. Mulligan, Calls for Faster, Fuller Disclo-
sure by Insiders Regulations: Reformers Say Official Reports of Stock Sales by Enron's Lay Came Too
Late to do Investors Any Good, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at Cl.
127. See Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited Partners: Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its Deals, Didn't
Force Issue, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at Al.
128. WILLIAM C. PowERs, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMM. OF THE BOARD OF DIRECToRs OF ENRON CORP. 25-26 (2002), at http://
news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rptl.pdf (last accessed Feb. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter Powers Report].
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anomalies. They were certainly not the norm. There are two clear
truths that support the isolated nature of the misbehavior.
First, it is widely noted that Enron fostered a culture of risk taking
in business ventures. Jeffery Skilling, Enron's CEO from February
2001, was the driving force behind this attitude. 29 Skilling's approach
to management tended to foreclose dissent from his ranks because of
his aggressive, all-knowing attitude. One colleague noted that Skilling
could "out-argue God,"1 30 and another, when queried on the attitudes
at Enron noted, "[w]e were creating a very arrogant management
team .... We were trying to project a figure of a Super Human."1 3'
At WorldCom the same pattern emerges. There it was Bernard
Ebbers who drove his company into near-total collapse when he took a
$408 million loan from the company to pay off a personal debt.' 32
Ebbers' personal wealth was tied closely to the price of the stock, cre-
ating incentives for him to encourage and even direct unscrupulous
accounting methods.' 33 Ebbers now faces criminal charges for his ac-
tions in Oklahoma state court.'3 4
The evidence points greatly in the direction of the CEOs as the
perpetrators of the fraud. Their dominating personalities, together
with their "do-no-wrong" attitudes drove their fortunes into
insolvency.
The second element present in all of the corporate misconduct
was a laxity within the accounting industry. The major thrust of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was directed at creating a Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") to supervise the conduct of the
major accounting firms.13 5 The accounting industry, prior to the Act,
followed generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") 136 when
performing audits and preparing financial statements. Those princi-
129. See April Witt & Peter Behr, Dream Job Turns into a Nightmare; Skilling's Success Came
at High Price, WASH. PosT, Jul. 29, 2002, at Al.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Sakar, supra note 82, at B1.
133. See BarnabyJ. Feder, Management Practice Enabled Huge Fraud, 2 Investigations Find,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at Cl.
134. See Barnaby J. Feder & Kurt Eichenwald, A State Pursues WorldCom; Effects Seen on
U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at Cl.
135. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-109, 116 Stat.
750-769 (2002); see also Shailagh Murray, Leading the News: Bill Overhauling Audit Regulation
Passes in Senate, WALL ST. J., Jul. 16, 2002, at A3.
136. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (7th ed. 1999) ("The conventions, rules and pro-
cedures that define approved accounting practices at a particular time .... The principles
include not only broad guidelines of general application but also detailed practices and
procedures.").
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ples are established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB), which is comprised of an independent body of accounting
professionals.13 7 The FASB was unregulated, and exerted great pres-
sure on Congress to avoid any constraints on its ability to police its
own ranks.
With the establishment of the PCAOB, it is hoped that govern-
ment regulators will establish the standards, independent of what the
accounting industry would like to see.
The thrust of all of this is that attorneys were not the major
sources of the corporate scandals-the CEOs and accountants were. It
makes sense that the majority of the legislation was directed at them,
not at the lawyers who served them. This is another reason why the
standards for attorney conduct are largely irrelevant, because they ad-
dress a perceived problem that never really existed in the first place.
The new rules for attorney disclosure mark a dangerous step for-
ward by Congress and the SEC. The new laws are essentially an over-
reaction to public outcry at corporate wrongdoing. As with all quickly
executed, sweeping legislative changes, the full effects of the new law
will take years to percolate through court decisions, altering many
things that were never intended to be touched. Attorney conduct will
also be shifted, as lawyers struggle to understand the full impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and how it will affect their everyday practice of
law.
B. Unintended Side Effects
1. Loopholes Under the New Disclosure Rules Will Make Silence
the New Standard
The concept for the ladder up reporting was based partly on a
report by William Powers 138 released after an investigation of the
scope of wrongdoing at Enron. 139 The report found that, in at least
one instance, a junior attorney working in-house for Enron ques-
tioned, in a memo to senior attorneys, the legitimacy of some of the
company's financial transactions.1 40 The attorney, a relative neophyte
137. See id. at 644.
138. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron Official Says Many Knew About Shaky Company Fi-
nances, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at Al (noting "Mr. Powers, the dean of the University of
Texas School of Law, was appointed to the board in October [2001] to lead an investiga-
tion into the company's partnership deals." He resigned his position when the report was
completed in February 2002.).
139. Powers Report, supra note 126, at 36.
140. See April Witt & Peter Behr, Dream Job Turns Into a Nightmare, WASH. POST, July 29,
2002, at AO1.
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to the Enron family, commented that "transactions posed grave risks
and 'might lead one to believe that the financial books at Enron are
being manipulated. '" 14 1 The response he received was a reprimand
from his supervising attorney, who chided him for using language that
was "critical and inflammatory" in the memo. 142 However, as was later
revealed, that attorney was entirely correct-Enron had cooked the
books and relied on dubious accounting methods to convince the un-
fortunate skeptics who dared to ask what they were doing.
Under the newly adopted rules by the SEC, the junior attorney
has a duty to report "evidence of a material violation"'143 to "his or her
supervising attorney."14 4 The duty would then fall on the senior attor-
ney to report the evidence to the company's chief legal officer as the
first step in the whole ladder-up process. 145 As an additional safe-
guard, the SEC rule provides that the junior attorney can go over his
superior's head, straight to the chief legal officer ("CLO") or CEO if
he/she "reasonably believes that a supervisory attorney to whom he or
she has reported evidence of a material violation . . . has failed to
comply with [the ladder-up reporting requirements] "146
So, in theory, this situation should never occur again. The junior
Enron attorney who spotted wrongdoing, after being rebuffed by his
seniors, would now be able to march straight into the office of the
CLO or the CEO and divulge his dossier of evidence of wrongdoing
and expose the fraud to fresh air. However, there are two things that
will make this scenario almost certain never to occur.
First, the rule provides that the junior attorney "may" take the
initiative to go over the head of his senior attorney, not that he is
required to do so. 14 7 So, even after this rule is adopted, junior level
attorneys will have the option to report the perceived violation to
their superiors, wait for a response, and if it is negative or critical,
simply let the matter go, choosing not to take the matter any further.
Second, the reality of corporate culture and pressures of pleasing
superiors to gain promotion make it highly unlikely that an attorney
at a junior level will buck the trend and blow the whistle. In many
instances, an attorney with relatively minimal experience may doubt
his own understanding of financial matters such as those at Enron. He
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2002).
144. Id. § 205.5(c).
145. See Id. § 205.3(b).
146. Id. § 205.5(d).
147. Id. § 202.6(c).
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may be hesitant to bring the matter to his seniors, let alone attract the
ire and potential of career suicide by going beyond those he works
under to the top.
In many ways junior staff are in the best position to detect fraud
because they are more likely to bring youthful enthusiasm to their
efforts and use a sharp eye to catch things that superiors may have
missed. However, the dual nature of this rule-allowing the junior
attorney to go over his senior's head but with no requirement that he
do so-coupled with the realities of corporate life, make it unlikely
that the ladder-up provisions will have any significant impact.
The same concerns will affect the judgment of senior attorneys in
a corporation. Will they seek to draw the negative attention of the
CLO or CEO if they sense that something might be amiss? For the in-
house attorney this might mean risking his career at the company. For
the outside counsel, it might mean losing the client to another firm in
a competitive marketplace.
The new rules issued by the SEC have a loophole to potentially
avoid the duty to speak. An attorney has a duty under the new rules to
report evidence of a material violation.1 48 Material violation is defined
in another section as meaning "credible evidence, based upon which
it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and
competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur."' 49
This definitional text sets a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard to judge reasonableness.' 50 In theory, if an attorney found some
piece of evidence that indicated the issuer was engaged in wrongdo-
ing, he may not have any reasonable grounds to conclude at that time
there is anything amiss. Under the new rules, to avoid trouble, his
wisest course would be to ignore that information, rather than to in-
vestigate further. If the attorney was questioned later, he could con-
tend that although he saw some potentially troubling evidence, he was
only thirty percent certain that any violation was possible. John Coffee
of Columbia Law School has noted that although such a circumstance
seems farfetched, it is exactly the kind of rationalizing that an attorney
engages in every day. 151
148. Id. § 205.3(b).
149. Id. § 205.2(e).
150. See John C. Coffee Jr., Myth and Reality: SEC's Proposed Attorney Standards, 229
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 16, 2003, at 5.
151. See id.
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Thus, one effect of the rule is to chill the communication be-
tween the attorney and the client. The attorney's instincts will steer
him away from actually investigating the matter, thus choosing a
course that directs him away from any disturbing signals. And if the
potential violation appears severe enough to warrant further action,
what is a senior attorney likely to do?
According to the new rules, his first action should be to contact
the CLO of the issuer, to alert him to a potentially material violation.
In reality, his first action is likely to get a second opinion on the rea-
sonableness of his suspicion, to determine if he should go forward or
not. One former SEC general counsel sees things progressing this way
under the new rules. "There will be more lawyers hired... [e]veryone
will want someone else's opinion as to whether their opinion is rea-
sonable as they go up the ladder.' '1 5
2
Attorneys will never be sure if they are reasonable in going to the
CLO in the first place, and they will never be sure whether the re-
sponse they receive from the CLO is reasonable enough to avoid go-
ing forward to the next step on the ladder. 5 3 To avoid guessing and
the potential liability that might arise, the best option would be to
have another counsel view the evidence and give an opinion on the
reasonableness of the actions.
This scenario is more than likely to occur. However, this can
hardly be something desired by the originators of the legislation. The
attorneys will place their focus on their actions vis-a-vis the material
violations, not whether there were violations or not. The issue will
center on the attorney's conduct, not the conduct of the issuer. Even
if there is a violation in progress, and the attorney alerts the CLO, who
responds in reasonable time to make the reporting attorney reasona-
bly sure that something is being done, the inquiry will end. If the re-
porting attorney gets a second opinion to bolster his position,
everyone will feel good that something has been done. However, the
material violation may live on after all this process is complete.
152. Kathleen Day, Lawyers as Stool Pigeons?; SEC May Force Attorneys to Blow Whistle on
Corporate Clients, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2003, at E01.
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(1) ("Reasonable or reasonably denotes, with respect to the
actions of an attorney, conduct that would not be unreasonable for a prudent and compe-
tent attorney.").
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2. A Glimpse of the Future: The Changes Sarbanes-Oxley May
Continue to Bring
a. The Noisy Withdrawal Proposal
At the time the final rules for section 307 were adopted, the SEC
deferred on implementing its most controversial rule proposal-the
noisy withdrawal. Although packaged with the original rule release,1 54
it engendered such heated response from the securities bar that it was
tabled for an additional comment period.1 5 5 The SEC respectfully
noted that the "compressed time period resulting from the 180-day
implementation deadline" was insufficient to render a thoughtful rule
of such a sweeping change in securities law.' 56
The noisy withdrawal requirement would have added an addi-
tional rung to the top of the ladder imposed by section 307. Instead of
stopping at the issuer's board of directors, 1 57 the attorney would be
required to "withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer, indicat-
ing that the withdrawal is based on professional considerations."' 1 58
The withdrawal is called "noisy" because it would alert the SEC to po-
tential violations of the securities laws and allow them to focus their
resources on investigating the implicated company.
This robust proposal was criticized because many felt that it ex-
ceeded the mandate that Congress had established for the SEC under
section 307.159 Many are concerned that such a proposal would unrea-
sonably alter the attorney-client relationship by requiring the issuer's
counsel to essentially breach the trust by alerting the SEC of with-
drawal. 160 The review and comment process regarding the noisy with-
drawal is ongoing. The rule may become a reality, especially if more
corporate fraud appears in the months ahead.
154. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PROPOSED RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS 1, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/fi-
nal/33-8150.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
155. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF STAN-
DARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEiS 2, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8185.htm (last accessed Oct. 28, 2003).
156. Id.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (3) (iii).
158. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PROPOSED RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR AT-rORNEYS 7, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro-
posed/33-8186.htm (last accessed Oct. 31, 2003).
159. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Modifies New Attorney Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2003,
at ClI.
160. See Mitchell Pacelle & Michael Schroeder, Proposed SEC Rules Could Turn Lawyers
into Whistle-Blowers, WALL ST. J., Jan.9, 2003, at Al.
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b. Revisions to the ABA Model Rules
Finally, the changes are prompting revisions to attorney ethics
standards, whittling away attorney-client confidentiality. The Ameri-
can Bar Association has proposed adding language to Model Rule
1.6(b) that would allow an attorney to disclose confidential informa-
tion to stop a client from committing a crime that would bring finan-
cial loss to others. 16 1 The impact of this proposed change has two
notable consequences.
First, the canons of professional conduct have stated frequently
that disclosure of confidential information should only occur in the
most extreme circumstances-when the attorney's client is reasonably
certain to kill or substantially injure another human being.1 62 Califor-
nia's requirement is more extreme, stating that an attorney must
"maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or
herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client. ' 163 The lesson has
always been that an attorney should blow the whistle only in the most
extraordinary circumstances; that client confidences have a hallowed
sanctity. The bar will be lowered considerably if financial injury serves
as adequate ground for breach of the duty of confidentiality. The
spectrum of crimes ranging from murder to securities fraud includes
thousands of other bad acts that a client might contemplate. If excep-
tions are made for securities fraud, practitioners and the public will
clamor to have exceptions carved out for many other misdeeds.
The second troubling aspect of the proposed changes to the eth-
ics rules is that thousands of attorneys who have little familiarity with
the SEC, securities regulation, or the requirements under the '33 and
'34 Acts will suddenly be required to watch out for clients who are
possibly engaging in garden-variety financial fraud. If the proposed
changes to Rule 1.6 are adopted, these attorneys will now face the
decision of whether or not to break the confidence of their client and
alert shareholders or even the police. While exposing fraud is a lauda-
161. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (proposed rule change
from Task Force on Implementation of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
2003).
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: to prevent the client from com-
mitting a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer's services.
Id.
162. See id. 1.6(b)(1).
163. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2002).
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ble goal, it should not be the attorney's role to police it. Rather than
expose a client and breach his trust, the attorney should maintain the
confidence of the client and encourage him to correct the error and
comply with the law. This is the traditional and proper role of coun-
sel-as advocate against lawbreaking, not as constable of the bar.
A full treatment of the ethical rule changes is not possible here
and is the proper subject of a larger analytical thesis. However, these
examples show how far reaching the impact of the section 307
changes has been and will continue to be in the coming years.
C. The Path Not Followed-Safeguards Removed Before the
Frenzy Started
When the lights went out on the stock market party, most inves-
tors realized their wallets were empty and wondered, where were all
the corporate police? Before, it seemed, there were too few. Now, it
seems, there are too many, as the SEC has essentially deputized every
corporate attorney who works in any capacity with a publicly held
company, forcing them to be on the lookout for fraud.
In the years before Enron exploded there were important safe-
guards in place. Slowly they were whittled away until a dangerous situ-
ation was created. This Comment will now examine two subtle market
policing devices that disappeared in the years leading up to the end of
the bubble, but could be revived again as alternatives to imposing the
heightened ethics standards on attorneys.
1. The PSLRA Ended Many Frivolous Lawsuits but Helped Bar
Legitmate Ones as Well
With great fanfare in 1994, the Republican party swept into con-
trol of Congress after 40 years as the minority party of the House and
the Senate. 164 As part of their collective campaign to retake the
House, they touted the Contract with America, a list of promises to
enact legislation if elected, focusing on tax cuts, welfare reform, and a
Presidential line-item veto.' 65 As a part of the contract, Republicans
delivered to the American voters the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act ("PSLRA").1 66
164. See Adam Clymer, The 1994 Elections: Congress, G.O.P. Celebrates its Sweep to
Power; Clinton Vows to Find Common Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994 (Late Edition),
at Al.
165. See David E. Rosenbaum, Republicans Offer Voters a Deal for Takeover of the House, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994 (Late Edition), at A16.
166. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995).
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Prior to the PSLRA, companies were subjected to what many con-
sidered harassing litigation. 67 When the stock price in a particular
company declined, often by only small percentages, a class-action law-
suit would be filed by the aggrieved shareholders.1 68 The complaint
would typically present a prima facie case and discovery would com-
mence. Since the cost of going forward to defend such suits was rela-
tively high, many were settled despite the possibly meritless nature of
the actions. 169
The PSLRA was designed in part to elevate the pleading require-
ments and discourage the filing of lawsuits that could not state with
some specificity corporate acts that reduced shareholder value. 170
Thus, a complaint filed to recover money damages for securities fraud
must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.11 7 The Ninth
Circuit later interpreted this to require a plaintiff plead "deliberate
recklessness" on the part of a defendant to survive a summary judg-
ment motion. 172 Deliberate recklessness is so close to fraudulerit in-
tent that a difference can hardly be discerned.
Additionally, the PSLRA included automatic stays on discovery
while a motion to dismiss is pending,17 3 a safe harbor for potentially
misleading forward looking statements made by executives and under-
167. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730-31 (1995).
The House and Senate Committees heard evidence that abusive practices com-
mitted in private securities litigation include: (1) the routine filing of lawsuits
against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant change in
an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer,
and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some
plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including
accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by insurance,
without regard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery process to
impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to
settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they
purportedly represent.
Id.
168. See William S. Lerach, Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act's Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 598 (1998) (noting that many
suits were filed "based merely upon the fact that a stock price had dropped ten percent or
more").
169. See Eugene P. Caiola, Comment, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Uni-
form Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REv. 309, 315-16 (2000).
170. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1998).
172. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(f).
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writers,1 74 and elimination ofjoint and several liability. 175 The PSLRA
changes were met with resistance, including one individual who noted
that the PSLRA was "trying to eliminate frivolous lawsuits, and one way
to do it is to make sure there are no lawsuits at all. But we don't think
that's a good approach."' 7 6
The filing of frivolous lawsuits that primarily enriched class action
plaintiffs attorneys was and is a real problem. Even former SEC chair-
man Arthur Leavitt noted in 1995 that "current litigation practices can
be made fairer for both investors and corporations, especially in the
area of class-action litigation."1 77 But the fact remains that those law-
suits acted as a form of policing the market, if for no other reason
than to remind public companies that someone was watching them
closely and had the power and resolve to challenge them. The settle-
ment of a claim occurs when the plaintiff has a legitimate chance of
winning on the merits, and the settlement tends to be proportionate
to the value of the claim. 178 If the PSLRA had limited only the plain-
tiffs attorney's fees and nothing more, it would have discouraged all
but the most intrepid from filing class action claims. By setting such
high standards for pleading, it penalized plaintiffs themselves and en-
ded a unique form of internal policing of the market.
2. The Disappearance of Aiding and Abetting Liability Destroyed a
Major Tool To Address Fraud by Those Who Assisted in
Securities Fraud
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court eliminated the possibility of
pursuing aiders and abetters of securities fraud in the Central Bank
decision. 1 79 Congress was surprised by this development because aid-
ing and abetting liability had long been an implied cause of action
under Rule lob-5. 180 In partial response, Congress included legisla-
tion within the PSLRA that restored to the SEC enforcement power to
act against aiders and abetters. 181 However, private litigants are still
174. Id. § 78u-5(a).
175. Id. § 78u-5(c).
176. Diana B. Henriques, SEC Chief Assails Bill Restricting Litigation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26,
1995, at D2.
177. Id.
178. See Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation: The
Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 959, 962-63 (1996).
179. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
180. See Nicole Miller, Note, The Judicial Rejection of Aiding and Abetting Civil Liability
Under Section 10(b), 1995 UTAH L. REV. 913 (1995).
181. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-5 (1999).
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foreclosed from seeking damages against aiders and abettors, includ-
ing an issuer's attorney unless the attorney can be shown to be a pri-
mary violator.
18 2
The dissent in Central Bank was shocked by the majority opinion.
Justice Stevens noted that " [i] n hundreds ofjudicial and administrative
proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the
SEC have concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5" and that "all 11 Courts of Appeals to
have considered the question have recognized a private cause of ac-
tion against aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." 183 In
fact, the parties in Central Bank were directed by the Supreme Court to
address the issue of aiding and abetting liability-it was not at issue
and thought by both petitioner and respondent to be settled law. 184
The strength of Rule lOb-5 is that it applies to "any person, directly or
indirectly" who employs "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
an investor.185
An alternative to the sweeping changes of the section 307 require-
ments would be for Congress to overrule the Central Bank decision
and re-instate aiding and abetting liability, specifically targeted to-
wards attorneys who assist in corporate fraud. There exists no better
way to encourage compliance with the securities laws than to impose
potential liability on law firms. This action could even encourage self-
initiated noisy withdrawals, as respectable firms learn of client malfea-
sance and withdraw to save themselves.
Conclusion
The new rules of professional conduct set forth in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act are a dangerous overreach in the face of immediate crisis.
First, they were developed to address a perceived problem that never
really existed in a widespread way. Second, the actual rules adopted by
the SEC deny the reality of corporate life and have been set up to
allow enough loopholes to make them basically unenforceable. Fi-
nally, they have spawned and will continue to generate revisions to the
practice of law that were never intended to occur.
182. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191 ("Any person or entity, including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material mis-
statement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as
a primary violator under 10b-5.").
183. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
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This is not to say that the entire Act was without merit. Certainly
the sections that have addressed greater oversight of the accounting
industry, as well as increasing the penalties for executive fraud, will
hopefully have a lasting impact on the future of the securities indus-
try. Attorneys have a role in this industry as well, but section 307 has
improperly placed the burden of policing on the everyday corporate
lawyer. Policing mechanisms were removed that could have helped
avoid the trouble, and some of those mechanisms could be replaced.
Section 307 will rest largely as a warning to those firms like Vinson &
Elkins who breach the public trust, and to the rest, only an arcane
sideshow of a horrible time in the history of American corporate life.
